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Abstract 
 
Salmi, Timo and Ilkka Virtanen (2001). Economic Value Added: A simulation analysis of 
the trendy, owner-oriented management tool. Acta Wasaensia No. xx, 33 p. 
 
The value-based management performance measure EVA introduced by Stern Stewart & 
Co. is an incarnation of the underlying residual income (RI) concept. The concept is 
evaluated and compared with traditional profitability measures within a controlled 
simulation framework. It is observed that EVA is very sensitive to its cost of equity 
component, but it is unexpectedly insensitive to its cost of debt component under regular 
conditions. EVA and its variability are observed to be strongly affected by the firm's 
growth policies because of leverage effects. EVA is observed to be much more unstable 
than the traditional return on investment and directly related to the return on equity 
measure. Methodologically, the paper demonstrates the advantages of using a controlled 
simulation approach in financial research. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The success of the firm depends on its management having theoretically sound and in 
practice operational tools for planning, decision making and monitoring. Developing new 
management accounting and decision tools is a very current subject both in business and 
consultation practice, as well as in academic research. During the last few years this 
development has become even more prominent thanks to several new techniques and 
concepts, both financial and non-financial. These include Activity Based Management, 
Balanced Scorecard, Benchmarking, Total Quality Management, and the Economic Valued 
Added (EVA) and Market Value Added (MVA) variants. 
 
The firm has a number of stakeholders with differing, sometimes conflicting goals. The 
stakeholders include the owners, lenders, management, personnel, customers, suppliers and 
creditors, government and regulatory agencies. In corporate governance agency theory the 
managers are regarded as agents of the owners in stockholders' wealth-maximization. 
Among the management tools EVA, in particular, emphasizes the interests of the owners. 
 
The concept of the economic value added is similar to the traditional accounting concept of 
Residual Income (RI); see Stark and Thomas (1998:446) and their references. The concept 
emerges in several variations and incarnations including the trade-marked Stern Stewart & 
Co's EVA with its copious accounting adjustments (Stewart 1991, Stewart 1994, Stern, 
Stewart & Chew 1995, and Stern Stewart & Co. 1997). 
 
In line with the theory of finance the RI derivative EVA is commonly advocated as a 
management tool because the goal of the firm is to add to the value of the owners' wealth. 
In other words, the owners expect a maximum compensation over the cost of the capital 
invested in the firm. A central question concerning EVA is how sensitive this management 
tool is to the changes in its various components, management policies and external 
economic factors. 
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Despite the unambiguous theoretical definition, applying EVA even in its pure, theoretical 
format is not straight-forward. EVA is defined as the difference between the firm's profit 
and cost of all capital employed, i.e. the weighted average cost of debt and equity. 
Measuring the profit of the firm and measuring the components of the cost of capital is 
problematic both in theory and in practice. In particular, measuring the cost of equity is a 
highly involved issue. A simulation approach is used in this paper to better facilitate 
investigating the behavior of EVA under varying management policies and cost conditions. 
 
 
2. Categories of Previous Research 
 
The origins of the value added concepts date all the way back to the early 1900's 
(Bromwich & Walker, 1998:392). The concept resurfaced in 1990's much thanks to the 
consulting firm Stern Stewart & Co's successful launching of the economic value added as 
the trademark EVA and the subsequent adoption by several major corporations. The 
ensuing research work in literature roughly falls into three categories. 
 
1. Mainly professional literature mostly aimed at presenting, promoting or discussing the 
EVA concepts in relation to consulting work. While most of this, partly anecdotal, 
literature looks at the advantages of the concept, a few critical views also occur in this 
category. The seminal work in this first category is Stewart (1991). Subsequent sources 
are too numerous for an extensive listing, but for instance there is material such as 
Milunovich & Tsuei (1996), Anctil, Jordan & Mukherji (1998), Damodaran (1999), 
Mouritsen (1998), Bowen & Wallace (1999), and Dodd & Johns (1999). There also is 
much WWW based material such as Mäkelä (1998), Weissenrieder (1999), and Stern 
Stewart & Co. (2000). 
 
2. Empirical research literature measuring the strength of the relation between market 
returns (or market value) and EVA compared to the relation between market returns and 
the traditional income measures. O'Byrne (1996:125) concludes that "EVA, unlike 
NOPAT [net operating profit after taxes] or other earnings measures like net income or 
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earnings per share, is systematically linked to market value. It should provide a better 
predictor of market value than other measures of operating performance." Also 
Uyemura, Kantor & Pettit (1996) arrive at similar conclusions. Stark & Thomas 
(1998:445) provide "some support for the advocates of the use of RI for planning and 
control" from the market relation. However, Biddle, Bowen & Wallace (1997:331-332) 
find "little evidence to support the Stern Stewart claim that EVA is superior to earnings 
in its association with stock return or firm values". On the other hand, EVA or RI do not 
do decisively worse. Chen & Dodd (1997:331) conclude that EVA measures provide 
relatively more information than the traditional measures of accounting in terms of the 
stock return association, but that EVA should not entirely replace the traditional 
measures since measures such as E/P, ROA and ROE have incremental value in 
monitoring firm performance. They also observe that there is no significant difference 
between EVA and the traditional RI in terms of the association with stock returns. The 
most critical results are by Bao & Bao (1998). 
 
3. Literature looking at EVA as a management tool from the point of view of the 
accounting measurement. O'Hanlon & Peasnell (1998) thoroughly discuss EVA as a 
value-based performance indicator, Stern Stewart Co's intricate adjustments, EVA 
benchmarks, and EVA-base bonuses. Bromwich & Walker (1998) add to the theoretical 
discussion by pondering the EVA debate all the way from Hicksian income concepts. 
Pfeiffer (2000) considers mathematically EVA vs. discounted cash flow methods for 
resolving internal agency problems in decentralized decision making. Besides the 
theoretical discussion understanding is needed about the numerical behavior of the EVA 
under different conditions and about EVA's numerical relationship to the accounting 
measures like Return on Investments (ROI), Return on Equity (ROE) and to economic 
profitability measures like the Internal rate of Return (IRR). 
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3. Research Problem and Approach Selection 
 
The partly conflicting results in the earlier literature make it difficult to get a grasp of 
EVA’s behavior vis á vis the traditional accounting measures. More information is needed 
of the behavior patterns of the EVA measure. The generic research task of this paper is to 
observe and assess how the EVA measure behaves under different, realistic financial 
conditions and compare it to the simultaneous behavior of the more traditional profitability 
indicators such as ROI, ROE and IRR. This general task involves the following, more 
detailed research questions: 
 
• How sensitive is EVA to the level of the debt and equity cost components?  
• Business firms typically assume different kind of growth strategies. Is EVA 
sensitive to the firm's alternative growth strategy choices? 
• How steady is EVA? Will it be affected by cyclical business fluctuations and 
irregular events in the level of the firm's activities? 
• What is the relationship between the behavior of EVA, ROE and ROI? 
• Will EVA give consistent signals under different financial developments for 
the firm? In particular, will a bankruptcy-bound firm's EVA give a sufficient, 
early warning? On the other hand are there circumstances where EVA gives too 
prudent a picture under an auspicious future?  
 
To tackle the posed problems suitable cases of firms are needed which highlight each of the 
above items. The ordinary option would be to search for representative, actual business 
data which would suit the questions. There are, however, complications: 1) suitable, 
unambiguous cases have to be found for achieving desired experimental designs, 2) the 
unavoidable problems in estimating the components of the cost of capital can affect the 
reliability of the results, 3) the practical accounting measurement problems of income 
determination and asset valuation must be tackled in the estimation. Instead, we adopt and 
extend an approach using simulated financial time-series in the spirit of Henderson, 
Peirson & Brown (1992) and Salmi & Virtanen (1997), which represent a controlled 
simulation approach. Also other simulation approaches have been applied, such as the 
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"what-if" kind of simulation for EVA decisions in Taylor, Blackall & Haas (1999). The 
major advantage of using simulated data is being able to generate different business 
situations for observation at will. Simulation also more easily facilitates ceteris paribus 
observation of the different cases. The second important advantage of the simulation 
approach is the following. The true, economic profit of a business firm is not easily 
measured from financial statements. However, in our simulation approach the true 
profitability (IRR) of the simulated firm is readily known, since it can be defined as one of 
the model's input parameters. Furthermore, the difficulties in defining the correct cost of 
equity can consequently be avoided since, adapting Fama & French (1999), the true 
profitability of the simulated firm defines the cost of equity. 
 
 
4. The Simulation Engine 
 
The simulation engine used in Salmi & Virtanen (1997) is adopted. It is extended by 
incorporating financing into the model. The time-series data generated by the simulation 
model facilitates studying varying cost of capital situations, varying profitability situations, 
the firm's growth strategies, and various business cycle and irregularities conditions. In 
particular, the development of the EVA, and the key financial ratios such as the financial 
leverage, ROI, and ROE are observed using the chosen experimental design. 
 
In the simulation model the capital investments are generated by the following multi-
plicative process with an exponential trend, a sinusoidal cycle, and an irregular variation 
made up of a normally-distributed noise component and a potential shock component 
 
(1) gt = g0(1+k)t{1 + A sin[(2πt/ Ψ) + φ]}(1 + σz)(1 + δ tτ  Y) ,  t = 1,...,T. 
 
The symbols are listed in Appendix 1. Using this capital investment generating process 
produces financial time series which closely resemble the time series profiles observed on 
actual business firms. See e.g. the sample of the time series drawn in Salmi et al. (1984:46-
48). 
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The capital investments gt induce subsequent cash inflows which can be defined in terms 
of a set of contribution coefficients bi. The contribution coefficients fix a capital 
investment's cash flow pattern. The total contribution ft in year t cumulates from the 
contributions from the capital investments made in the earlier years 
 
       min(N,t)        min(N,t) 
(2) ft =     Σ fti   =        Σ bi gt-i. 
          i=1                         i=1 
 
The run of the simulation years t = 1,...,T has been omitted for brevity since Formula (1). 
 
Assuming constant returns of scale and constant profitability in the customary fashion, the 
contribution coefficients define the profitability of the firm in terms of the internal rate of 
return 
 
   N 
(3)  Σ bi (1+r)-i  = 1. 
  i=1 
 
In the numerical simulation a distribution pattern i.e. the shape of the contribution 
coefficients must be fixed. The negative binomial distribution corresponding to a typical 
product life cycle is used (see Salmi & Virtanen, 1997) 
 
(4) bi = s(i+1) q2 (1-q)i , i = 1,...,N. 
 
Other distribution patterns, such as a uniform pattern or a steadily declining pattern could 
also be adopted. Such alternatives are not, however, presented in this paper, since we 
observed that they do not substantially affect the nature of the numerical results. 
 
The profit of the accounting period is defined by a simple income statement as the cash 
inflows less depreciation less the interest on loans 
 
(5) pt = ft - dt - ht. 
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The common straight-line depreciation method is applied by the simulated firm. Hence the 
depreciation, assuming a life-span of N years, is defined by 
 
        min(N,t) 
(6) dt =   Σ (1/N)gt-i . 
      i=1 
 
The same goes for the alternative depreciation methods as goes for alternative contribution 
patterns. They can be omitted from the presentation, since they are not crucial from point of 
view of the nature of the numerical results. The interest payments in (5) are defined later by 
Formula (9). 
 
The simplified balance sheet of the simulated firm is depicted by Figure 1. 
 
 
 Assets Liabilities + 
Owner's equity 
 
Pt Working capital Debt Bt 
 + Plant assets Common stock  St 
  Retained earnings  Rt 
Vt Total Total Vt 
 
Figure 1.  The balance sheet in year t. 
 
 
Ever since Salamon (1982:294) in defining the long-run profitability of the firm it has been 
conventional to regard the firm as a series of repetitive capital investments with a fixed 
life-span and a fixed cash-flow pattern. Furthermore, it is customary to assume that the 
working capital of the firm has the same profitability level as the firm's capital investments. 
Hence, we combine the simulated firm's plant assets and its working capital under the same 
caption. We define 
 
(7) Pt = Pt-1 + gt - dt. 
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Debt on the ending balance sheet of a year is defined by the beginning debt balance less the 
amortization on the old loans plus the new loans 
 
(8) Bt = Bt-1 - at + lt. 
 
The interest payments on a year's outstanding initial debt are calculated using the loan 
interest rate 
 
(9) ht = j⋅Bt-1. 
 
The amortization is made in equal installments until the loans' maturity 
 
        min(L,t) 
(10)  at =   Σ (1/L)lt-i . 
       i=1 
 
The capital investment schedule of the simulated firm is defined by (1). The necessary 
funding for the capital investments, interest payments, and amortization comes from cash 
inflows, and, when not sufficient, from the new loans 
 
      gt + ht + at - ft    if gt + ht + at - ft > 0 
(11)  lt =  
      0,       if gt + ht + at - ft ≤ 0. 
 
If the firm generates enough funds internally, no new loans are taken. Instead, the potential 
extra funds are paid out as dividends 
 
      0,       if gt + ht + at - ft > 0 
(12)  ot =  
      ft - gt - ht - at,    if gt + ht + at - ft ≤ 0. 
 
The retained earnings are defined by 
 
(13)  Rt = Rt-1 + pt - ot. 
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The level of common stock is kept constant in the simulation, i.e. no new stock issues are 
included in the model 
 
(14)  St = St-1. 
 
The book value of the firm at the end of each year is calculated from the liabilities plus the 
equity side of the balance sheet as 
 
(15)  Vt = Bt + St + Rt. 
 
 
5. Producing EVA and Key Financial Ratios 
 
The previous section presented the construction of the actual simulation engine. The model 
involves three main constituents, the input parameters, the actual model with the model 
variables, and the output produced by the model. The financial time-series produced by the 
model make up its primary output. Furthermore, the model can be customized to produce 
the key financial information. This section presents the calculation of EVA and selected 
key financial ratios in the framework of the model. 
 
In general terms EVA is defined in this paper in a manner similar to the RI (residual 
income) as (see e.g. Biddle et al., 1997:305-306) 
 
(16)  EVA = NOPAT - WACC ⋅ Capital 
 
where NOPAT is the net operating profit after taxes and WACC is the weighted average 
cost of capital. The trade-marked Stern Stewart & Co's EVA includes accounting 
adjustments both in NOPAT and the capital. The adjustments are too proprietary to be 
carried out in this paper. Fortunately, it is not to be expected that this has a bearing on the 
nature of the results (see e.g. Biddle et al. 1997 and Chen & Dodd 1997). Furthermore, we 
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do not include taxation in our model. Our NOPAT will be the accounting profit before the 
interest on loans. This will not affect the general pattern of the results. 
 
In terms of our simulation model the EVA is the profit before interest payments net of a 
charge for the cost of all debt and equity capital employed 
 
(17)  EVA t = (pt + ht) - ct Vt-1 
 
where the weighted average cost of capital for the year under observation is 
calculated from the cost j of debt and cost e of equity 
 
(18)  ct = j⋅Bt-1/ Vt-1 + e⋅(St-1 + Rt-1)/ Vt-1. 
  
An alternative format of (18) that emphasizes the effect of leverage on the average cost of 
capital can be written as 
 
(18a)  ct = e - (Bt-1/ Vt-1)⋅(e-j). 
  
In the above we have chosen to use the initial balances instead of e.g. annual averages of 
the balance sheets. 
 
In the finance literature one of the most involved issues is the assessment of the cost of 
capital. In particular, assessing the cost of equity is a difficult question both in practice and 
theory. In our simulation two alternative ways of defining the cost of equity will be used. In 
the above formulas it is given as an external parameter. However, the cost of equity can 
also be defined as the firm's internal rate of return (see Fama and French, 1999). Here we 
can utilize an important advantage of our simulation approach. The IRR is accurately 
known in the simulation.  
 
It is possible to define a theoretical version of the EVA using the economic profit on the 
assets net of a charge for the cost of all debt and equity capital employed. 
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(19)  TEVAt = rVt-1 - γtVt-1 
 
where the average weighted cost of capital is defined by the rate of interest and the firm's 
profitability 
 
(20)  γt = j⋅Bt-1/ Vt-1 + r⋅(St-1 + Rt-1)/Vt-1. 
 
The question naturally arises whether the practical EVA (17) vs. the theoretical EVA (19) 
will lead to substantially differing results. 
 
The model calculates also traditional financial ratios for profitability. Return on (the 
capital) investments is defined by 
 
(21)  ROIt = (pt + ht) / Vt-1. 
 
Return on equity is 
 
(22)  ROEt = pt / (St-1 + Rt-1). 
 
The firm's financial standing is reflected in its leverage defined by 
 
(23)  LEVt = Bt / Vt. 
 
EVA is a measure that is expressed in absolute, monetary terms. Nevertheless, it will be 
interesting to compare the behavior of a relative EVA to the firm's ROE and ROI. The 
latter is left for the simulation, but the former relation is easily assessed analytically. Define 
the relative EVA as 
 
(24)  EVARt = EVAt / (St-1 + Rt-1). 
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Using EVA definition (17), the definition of the weighted average cost of capital (18), and 
the formula for the interest payments (9), it is readily seen that the relative EVA is just the 
return on equity less the cost of equity 
 
(25)  EVARt = ROEt - e. 
 
 
6. Input Data Description 
 
The controllable variables and their variation ranges in the simulation experiments are 
given in Table 1. Appendix 2 gives one example of the simulated time-series constituting 
the cash flow statement, income statement, balance sheet, and the resultant EVA values 
and select financial ratios. 
 
Table 1.  The variation of the parameters in the simulation runs. 
 
Parameter Symbol Values 
First capital investment g0, P0 100.00 
First level of debt B0 70.00 
First level of common stock S0 30.00 
First level of retained earnings R0 0.00 
Growth rate k 0.04, 0.08, 0.12, 0.16 
True internal rate of return r 0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.12 
Interest rate on loans j 0.00 – r 
Cost of equity e 0.00, 0.05, 0.08, 0.12 
Maturity of loans L 5 
Business cycle amplitude A 0.50 
Business cycle length Ψ 6 years 
Technical phase adjustment φ π/6 
Noise term σ 0.20 
Shock timing τ ∞ (no shock) 
Shock coefficient Y 0 
Life-span of capital investments N 20 
Length of observation period n 13 (years 22-34) 
 
The selected combinations of the different input sets will become evident below in 
discussing the results for the research questions posed. 
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7. Effect of the Cost Components 
 
To study the effect of the cost components, the behavior of EVA and the select financial 
ratios is simulated under different profitability situations. We fix here the growth rate at 8% 
and vary the profitability around the fixed growth figure to emulate different profitability 
situations. We consider a firm with a weak profitability (4%) situation, a modest 
profitability (6%), a reasonable profitability (8%) where profitability equals the growth 
rate, and a good profitability (12%). 
 
The cost of loans can be considered an external variable determined by the interest rate on 
the markets. In the simulation runs the loan interest rate is varied all the way up from 0% 
(to see one end of an extreme case) to the long-run profitability of the firm's capital 
investments (the internal rate of return). Interest rates beyond the IRR are not considered, 
because a firm would not be viable under such circumstances. 
 
The measurement of the cost of equity is an involved issue both in practice and theory. One 
relevant way of looking at the concept, especially in connection with EVA, is regarding the 
cost of equity as the owners' required return on the capital they invest in the firm. In the 
simulation runs the cost of equity is varied from the extreme case of 0% up to a maximum 
of 12%. In particular, in line with Fama & French (1999), the case where the cost of equity 
is made equal to the IRR is interesting as a benchmark. The special strength of the 
simulation approach, as compared to empirical data from actual business observations, is 
that the true IRR will be available without any bias. 
 
The first question before it is conductive to observe EVA's behavior is to see under what 
loan costs the firm can stay generally viable. In a rudimentary framework one can observe 
what happens to the firm's leverage as a function of the load interest rate and the firm’s 
profitability. Figure 2 delineates the mean leverage for the observation period (years 22-34 
in the simulation, c.f. Appendix 2). As is to be expected, if the firm’s growth rate 
constantly exceeds its profitability, the firm's situation is not tenable in the long run. In 
Figure 2, when the profitability of the firm is 4% and it tries to grow at a rate of 8%, not 
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even practically costless loans can keep the firm afloat. On the other hand, when the 
profitability (12%) clearly exceeds the firm's growth rate (8%), the leverage curve is very 
flat until a sudden, steep upwards slope at the growth level. At normal profitability figures 
(6%, 8%) the leverage increases smoothly along the cost of loans. 
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Figure 2. Leverage as a function of the loan interest rate and profitability; growth k=8%, 
cost of equity e=5%. 
 
Next consider the behavior of EVA for the different levels of cost of loans under different 
levels of cost of equity, i.e. the shareholders' requirement of return. Figure 3 delineates the 
results for the case of balanced growth and profitability. 
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Figure 3. EVA as a function of the loan interest rate and the required rate of return on 
equity;  growth k=8%, profitability r=8%. 
 
When the required rate of return, i.e. the cost of equity equals the firm's true profitability (e 
= r = 8% in the figure) in line with Fama and French, it is evident from all our simulation 
results that the cost of loans has very little effect on the EVA of a viable firm. 
 
The theoretically correct cost of equity is not necessarily available to the stakeholders. In 
actual practice the cost of equity / required rate of return is determined on an ad hoc basis 
or estimated from market based data. This situation is exemplified in Figure 3 by the case 
of e = 5%. It is readily seen that on the other hand EVA stays insensitive to the cost of 
loans, but on the other hand the absolute level of EVA is significantly affected. 
 
It is also evident from the figure, that if the required rate of return is set unrealistically by 
the shareholders (e = 12% or e = 0% in Figure 3), EVA's behavior becomes more drastic. 
 
By definition, a comparison of the practical EVA (17) and theoretical TEVA (19) is 
relevant only when the required rate of return is set at the (true, but in practice unknown) 
profitability of the firm. Under these circumstances the EVA and TEVA figures are very 
close. This result is similar to the results concerning the economist's vs. accountant's 
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valuation of the firm's profits. For a further discussion and references see e.g. Salmi & 
Virtanen (1997:21). 
 
The results in this section indicate, somewhat contrary to the intuitive expectations, that (as 
long loans can be secured at viable rates), EVA is almost unaffected by the cost of loans. 
To summarize, we draw the following conclusion 
 
Under normal circumstances EVA is determined foremost by the firm’s 
profitability as long as the required rate of return is set as the finance 
theory dictates. 
 
 
8. Effect of Growth Strategies 
 
The firm may adopt different growth strategies in relation to its profitability - as long as 
sufficient funds can be obtained to finance the growth. To examine the consequences of 
different growth strategies for a profitability of 8% we produce the cases of slow (k=4%), 
normal (k=8%), fast (k=12%) and very fast growth (k=16%).  
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Figure 4. Annual EVA figures for different growth strategies; profitability r=8%, cost of 
equity e=5%, loan interest rate j=6%. 
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Figure 4 shows that the more aggressive the growth policy the more sensitive the EVA. 
This goes both for the level and the variability of the annual EVA figures. 
 
The mechanism that causes this behavior is rather obvious. At higher growth rates (with 
respect to the firm's profitability) more and more financial leverage is needed to keep the 
firm and the growth going. The increase in EVA and its variability comes through two 
effects. As a physical phenomenon, the growth increases the level of the earnings 
component as such. As a financial phenomenon, the increasing financial leverage gears 
upwards the returns earned on the shareholder's equity and thus adds economic value to the 
shareholders. 
 
It should be noted that the results in Figure 4 are obtained in a Modigliani-Miller type of 
setting. In other words, the calculations are performed under unchanging risk, fixed return 
requirements and non-increasing loan costs for the different growth levels. 
 
To conclude 
 
The (absolute) EVA figure and its variability are strongly affected by the 
firm's growth policy choices. 
 
In business practice EVA is a measure that is applied in absolute, monetary terms. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to compare the behavior of a relative EVA to ROE and ROI. 
It was already shown in (25) that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the relative 
EVA and the firm's ROE, which are only separated by the firm's cost of equity. This fact 
may be a good explanation for the empirical results such as Biddle, Bowen & Wallace 
(1997) and Chen & Dodd (1997) not finding evidence of an EVA supremacy over net 
income in explaining the firms' stock returns. 
 
Figure 5 delineates the behavior of the relative EVA at the different growth strategies in 
comparison with ROI. 
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Figure 5. Annual relative EVA figures for different growth strategies; profitability 
r=8%, cost of equity e=5%, loan interest rate j=6%. 
 
The behavior of the relative EVA shows both similar and different features as the absolute 
EVA. Again, the variability is significant. The more aggressive the growth policy the more 
sensitive the EVA. Despite the variability, the mean levels of the relative EVAs stay fairly 
constant. The mean levels are determined by the growth strategies.  
 
ROI behaves differently. It is a very good approximation of the profitability of the firm’s 
capital investments, i.e. the firm's IRR. There is very little fluctuation in the ROI figure. 
ROI is a highly robust measure. This result is in line with the results in Salmi & Virtanen 
(1997). 
 
The relative EVA figure level and variability of the relative EVA are 
strongly affected by the firm's growth policy choices. The traditional ROI 
is a very robust measure of the firm’s underlying profitability. 
 
Furthermore, the results show that on an annual level the EVA figures are affected by 
cyclical business fluctuations (and irregular events). On the other hand, the further, 
unreported simulation experiments done in the project, show that average nature of the 
EVA results are not affected by the cycles. 
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9. Signaling Financial Distress 
 
Does EVA warn of an approaching bankruptcy? The different kinds of bankruptcy 
definitions have to be considered: The economic bankruptcy where the value of the firm 
becomes negative, and the legal bankruptcy where the firm is foreclosed. 
 
Figure 3 indicates that, as is expected, if the firm is unable to earn profits in excess of the 
required return, EVA will go negative. However, the behavior under increasing loan 
interest rates is counter-intuitive. The answer would thus seem to be at most a qualified yes 
for EVA acting as a financial distress warning, as far as the economic value distress 
definition is used. The key issue is whether the owners have set a reasonable required 
return. If not, a perfectly sound firm will falsely appear to be in distress. 
 
Consider legal bankruptcy in the light of Figure 4. In practice, firms that develop an 
extremely high leverage will in many cases either go bankrupt, or at could be taken over for 
a restructuring. At least if risk premiums are not included, strongly leveraged (growth) 
firms will have higher and higher EVAs. Hence, the absolute EVA measure could be 
dangerously susceptible as a distress warning device. 
 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
During the 1990's value based management has made a strong entry in the assortment of 
management tools in the form of EVA as marketed in particular by Stern Stewart & Co. 
Research literature on the subject has roughly taken three different lines: the practical 
advocating consultation-line literature, the empirical share-returns predictor performance 
literature, and the theoretical accounting measurement discussion approach. The current 
paper examined the behavior of EVA under different, characteristic circumstances using 
controlled, simulated financial data. 
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The central idea of EVA is subtracting the cost of capital from the firm's profits to measure, 
as the term indicates, the economic additional value produced by the firm to its owners 
over the weighted cost of the capital employed. This raised the question of the effect of the 
debt and equity cost components on the behavior of EVA. It was observed that under 
realistic (with respect to the firm's profitability) required returns (cost of equity) the loan 
interest rate has little effect on the EVA's behavior until the cost of loans approaches the 
firm's profitability. This insensitivity can be considered a somewhat unforeseen result with 
respect to the intuitive expectations of EVA's behavior. On the other hand, as is expected, 
EVA behaves in a linear fashion with respect to the cost of equity. 
 
Business firms may and do adopt different growth strategies in relation to their profitability 
levels, ranging from conservative to aggressive. A interesting current example of the 
aggressive growth strategy choices have been the new information technology companies. 
It was confirmed in this paper that EVA and its variability are strongly affected by the 
firm's growth policy choices. This result is in line with expectations because the 
consequent increasing financial leverage gears up the return earned on the shareholders 
equity. 
 
The results have also a bearing on the debate of the relative merits of the value-based 
measures against the properties of traditional accounting measures. It was observed that 
even under regular economic circumstances (the relative) EVA is much more unstable than 
the traditional return on investment (ROI) measure. Furthermore, as was shown in the 
mathematical derivations, there is one-to-one correspondence between (the relative) EVA 
and the traditional return on equity (ROE). These findings subject to doubt the potential 
claims on EVA's supremacy over the more traditional accounting measures.  
 
Traditional financial ratios are commonly used also for distress prediction. It was observed 
that EVA does not have incremental value in the predicting. 
 
Besides the results arrived at concerning EVA and its relation to the traditional accounting 
profitability measures, this paper goes to demonstrate the good applicability of the 
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controlled simulation approach in financial research. The major advantages of the 
simulation approach are the ability to emulate different business situations at will and to 
facilitate a plausible ceteris paribus scrutiny of the relevant cases. 
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Appendix 1. List of Symbols 
 
Input parameters 
g0  = initial level of capital investments 
k  = growth rate of the capital investments 
A  = amplitude of the cycle 
Ψ   = length of the cycle 
φ  = technical phase adjustment for the cycle 
σ  = standard deviation of the random fluctuation in the capital expenditures 
Y  = capital investment shock coefficient 
τ  = the year of the capital investment shock (τ = ∞) for no shock in the  
 simulation) 
T  = length of the simulation period 
bi  = relative contribution from capital investment i years back 
N  = life-span of a capital investment project (the same for all capital  
   investments) 
r  = internal rate of return of the simulated firm, for the given bi and N 
q  = shape parameter for negative binomial distribution 
s  = scaling factor for negative binomial distribution 
j  = interest rate on loans 
L  =  maturity of loans 
e  = cost of equity 
 
Model variables 
gt  = capital investments in year t 
z  = random variable following the (0,1)-normal distribution 
δ tτ  = Kronecker's delta, δ tτ  = 1 when t = τ, and 0 otherwise 
ft   = cash inflow in year t 
fti  = absolute contribution (cash-inflow) in year t from capital investment i  
   years back 
pt  = accounting profit in year t 
ht  = interest on loans in year t 
dt  = depreciation in year t 
Pt  = plant assets plus working capital at the end of year t 
Bt  = debt at the end of year t 
St  = common stock at the end of year t 
Rt  = retained earnings at the end of year t 
Vt  = book value of the firm at the end of year t 
at  = amortization of loans in year t 
lt  = new loans taken in year t 
ot  = dividends paid out in year t 
ct  = weighted average cost of capital for year t 
γt  = "theoretical" weighted average cost of capital for year t 
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Output variables 
EVAt = economic value added in year t 
TEVAt = economic value added in year t based on the internal rate of return 
EVARt= relative economic value added in year t 
ROIt  = return on investments 
ROEt = return on equity 
LEVt = leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Example Simulated Time Series. 
 
Growth 8%, IRR 8%, interest rate on debt 6%, cost of equity 5%, negative binomial 
contribution distribution, straight-line depreciation, amplitude 50% for business cycles, 
noise 20%, no shock. 
 
Table A1.  Cash flow statement 
 
Year Funds from 
operations 
New 
loans 
Capital 
expenditure 
Amortization Interest 
on loans 
 ft lt gt at ht 
0 
1 
: 
21 
0.00 
 8.39  
: 
503.90 
70.00 
161.17 
: 
701.10 
100.00 
151.36 
: 
271.45 
0.00 
14.00 
: 
775.15 
0.00 
4.20 
: 
158.39 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
534.27 
559.50 
593.90 
640.33 
723.53 
819.94 
905.95 
951.64 
1014.31 
1107.32 
1270.40 
1381.92 
1467.61 
755.58 
 902.37 
1047.66 
1458.55 
1563.03 
1485.06 
1078.88 
1416.62 
1789.43 
2596.99 
1877.67 
1715.30 
1529.64 
  318.86 
  451.70 
  604.02 
 1048.43 
 1116.67 
  927.32 
  440.87 
  801.76 
 1158.04 
 1969.10 
 1138.25 
  996.62 
  771.56 
817.03 
  859.90 
  884.72 
  887.85 
  973.05 
 1145.44 
 1291.33 
 1326.63 
 1400.43 
 1466.60 
 1673.40 
 1751.92 
 1879.20 
153.95 
150.26 
152.81 
162.59 
196.83 
232.23 
252.61 
239.86 
245.26 
268.60 
336.42 
348.68 
346.48 
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Table A2.  Income statement 
 
Year Cash 
inflows 
Straight-line 
depreciation 
Interest 
on loans 
Operating 
   income 
 ft dt ht pt 
0 
1 
: 
21 
0.00 
8.39 
: 
503.89 
0.00 
5.00 
: 
252.49 
0.00 
4.20 
: 
158.39 
0.00 
-0.80 
: 
93.00 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
534.26 
  559.50 
  593.90 
  640.32 
  723.52 
  819.94 
  905.94 
  951.63 
 1014.31 
 1107.32 
 1270.40 
 1381.91 
 1467.61 
258.49 
 265.83 
 284.55 
 312.10 
 359.07 
 405.26 
 439.34 
 451.44 
 482.78 
 536.34 
 626.88 
 673.17 
 704.84 
153.95 
150.26 
152.81 
162.59 
196.83 
232.23 
252.61 
239.86 
245.26 
268.60 
336.42 
348.68 
346.48 
121.81 
 143.40 
 156.53 
 165.62 
 167.61 
 182.43 
 213.98 
 260.33 
 286.26 
 302.37 
 307.08 
 360.06 
 416.27 
 
 
Table A3.  Balance sheet 
 
Year WC+Plant 
  assets 
Debt Common 
 stock 
Retained 
earnings 
Total 
 assets 
 Pt Bt St Rt Vt 
0 
1 
: 
21 
100.00 
246.36 
: 
3439.20 
70.00 
217.17 
: 
2565.90 
30.00 
30.00 
: 
30.00 
0.00 
-0.80 
: 
843.29 
100.00 
246.36 
: 
3439.20 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
3499.56 
 3685.44 
 4004.92 
 4741.24 
 5498.84 
 6020.90 
 6022.43 
 6372.76 
 7048.02 
 8480.78 
 8992.15 
 9315.60 
 9382.32 
2504.45 
2546.92 
2709.86 
3280.56 
3870.54 
4210.16 
3997.70 
4087.69 
4476.69 
5607.08 
5811.35 
5774.74 
5425.18 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
965.11 
 1108.51 
 1265.05 
 1430.68 
 1598.30 
 1780.73 
 1994.72 
 2255.06 
 2541.32 
 2843.70 
 3150.79 
 3510.85 
 3927.13 
3499.56 
 3685.44 
 4004.92 
 4741.24 
 5498.84 
 6020.90 
 6022.43 
 6372.76 
 7048.02 
 8480.78 
 8992.15 
 9315.60 
 9382.32 
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Table A4.  EVA and financial ratios 
 
         
Year EVAt 
 
ROIt ROEt LEVt WACC 
ct 
 TEVAt 
 
WACC 
γt 
0 
1 
: 
21 
0.00 
 -2.30 
: 
53.99 
0.0000 
0.0339 
: 
0.0735 
0.0000 
-0.0270 
: 
0.1192 
0.7000 
0.8815 
: 
0.7461 
0.0000 
0.0570 
: 
0.0577 
 0.00 
  1.40 
: 
52.79 
0.0000 
0.0660 
: 
0.0646 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
78.15 
  93.64 
  99.61 
 100.87 
  94.58 
 101.02 
 123.45 
 159.09 
 172.01 
 173.81 
 163.40 
 201.02 
 239.23 
0.0802 
0.0839 
0.0839 
0.0820 
0.0769 
0.0754 
0.0775 
0.0831 
0.0834 
0.0810 
0.0759 
0.0788 
0.0819 
0.1395 
0.1441 
0.1375 
0.1279 
0.1148 
0.1120 
0.1182 
0.1286 
0.1253 
0.1176 
0.1069 
0.1132 
0.1176 
0.7156 
0.6911 
0.6766 
0.6919 
0.7039 
0.6993 
0.6638 
0.6414 
0.6352 
0.6612 
0.6463 
0.6199 
0.5782 
0.0575 
0.0572 
0.0569 
0.0568 
0.0569 
0.0570 
0.0570 
0.0566 
0.0564 
0.0564 
0.0566 
0.0565 
0.0562 
 51.31 
  50.08 
  50.93 
  54.19 
  65.61 
  77.41 
  84.20 
  79.95 
  81.75 
  89.53 
 112.14 
 116.22 
 115.49 
0.0651 
0.0657 
0.0662 
0.0665 
0.0662 
0.0659 
0.0660 
0.0667 
0.0672 
0.0673 
0.0668 
0.0671 
0.0676 
Mean 138.45 0.0803 0.1233 0.6634 0.0568  79.14 0.0665 
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